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Abstract
In this paper, I first showed that an indirect information measure is supported by ex-
pected learning cost minimization if and only if it satisfies: 1. monotonicity in Black-
well order, 2. sub-additivity in compound experiment and 3. linearity in mixing with
no information. Then I studied a dynamic information acquisition problem with flexi-
ble design of information dynamics, costly waiting and costly information. When flow
information measure satisfies the three conditions, dynamic problem can be solved in
two steps: solving a static rational inattention problem, and implementing optimal
learning dynamics. Optimal solution involves stationary Poisson direct signals: ar-
rival of signal directly suggests optimal action, and non-arrival of signal provides no
information.
1. Introduction
Information plays a central role in economic activities. It affects both strategic in-
teraction in games and single agent decision making under uncertainty. Information
is often endogenously acquired by decision maker, as opposed to being exogenously
endowed. Therefore, it is important to understand how information is acquired. This
boils down to a simple trade-off: the value of information and the cost of acquiring
information. Value of information is unambiguous in single agent decision problem
with uncertainty. It is measured by the increased expected utility from choosing opti-
mal actions measurable to informative signal realizations(see Blackwell et al. (1951)).
However, there has been less consensus on the proper form of information acquisi-
tion cost. One (probably most) popular measure of informativeness being used in
studying information acquisition problem is Entropy based mutual information and
its generalizations. This approached was initiated by Sims (1998, 2003), and applied
to a wide range of problems (Matejka and McKay (2014), Steiner et al. (2017), Yang
(2015), Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014), etc.). Despite its great theoretical tractabil-
ity, Entropy based model suffers from criticism on its unrealistic properties, including
prior dependence, invariant likelihood ratio of action etc.
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ing cost”. I thank Yeon-Koo Che, Mark Dean, Pietro Ortoleva, Philipp Strack and Michael Woordford
for useful discussions.
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Two approaches can be taken to build a solid foundation for studying information
acquisition. One approach is to fully characterize behavior implications associated
with mutual information and its generalizations. Then we will be able to test behavior
validity of these models. Caplin et al. (2017) took this approach and proposes testable
axioms for Shannon model of rational inattention and its generalizations. The other
approach is to impose only minimal assumption on cost of information and study
robust predictions from an information acquisition problem. In this paper I take the
second robust approach and focus on dynamic information acquisition problem: a
decision maker acquires information about payoff relevant state before choosing an
action. She can choose an arbitrary random process as observed information, subject
to cost on information and cost on waiting.
I accomplish two main goals. First, I characterize “minimal assumption” on (static)
information measure if decision maker can choose from not only all information struc-
tures but also all combinations of them. I show that an indirect information measure
is supported by expected learning cost minimization— there is a totally general mea-
sure of information, and for any information structure (Blackwell experiment), we
minimize expected total measure of compound experiment which replicates original
information structure— if and only it satisfies three simple conditions. 1. Monotonic-
ity: Blackwell more informative experiment has higher measure. 2. Sub-additivity:
expected total measure of replicating compound experiment is higher than measure
of original experiment. 3. C-linearity: mixing uninformative experiment with a pro-
portion of informative experiment has measure proportional to measure of the infor-
mative part.
Second, I solve a dynamic information acquisition problemwith those assumptions
imposed on flow information measure. I show that solving the dynamic problem can
be divided into two steps. The first step is to solve a static rational inattention problem
for an optimal static information structure. The second step is to solve for optimal dy-
namic implementation of solution to first step. Optimal information process involves
stationary Poisson direct signals: signal arrives as Poisson processes and suggests the
optimal action directly. When no signal arrives, posterior belief process stays at prior.
Related Literature
My paper is closed related to two sets of works that aimed at understanding mea-
sure of information. The first tries to characterize implications (testable or non-testable)
of commonly used information measures. Basic mathematical implications and char-
acterizations for Entropy and Entropy based mutual information was provided in
standard information theory text book like Cover and Thomas (2012). Matejka and
McKay (2014) and Dean (2013) studied behavior implications for rational inattention
model based on Mutual information and posterior separable information measure re-
spectively. Caplin and Dean (2015) studied implications for rational inattention model
based on general information measure. A full behavior characterization for mutual in-
formation, posterior separable information cost and their generalizations is provided
in Caplin et al. (2017). Meanwhile, the second seeks to build dynamic foundation for
common information measures. Morris and Strack (2017) showed that posterior sep-
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arable function can be represented as induced cost from random sampling. He´bert
and Woodford (2016) justified a class of information cost function (including mutual
information) based on a continuous-time sequential information acquisition problem.
My paper contributes to this literature by providing a new optimization foundation
for posterior separability. Posterior separability is actually equivalent to additivity in
expected measure of compound experiments. I show that sub-additivity is justified by
expected information cost minimization.
My paper is also closed related to the dynamic information acquisition literature,
in which the main goal is to characterize the learning dynamics. A common approach
in this literature is to model information flow as a simple family of random process.
The decision maker can control parameters which represents aspects of interest. Wald
(1947) first studies stopping problem with exogenous information process. Moscarini
and Smith (2001) and Che and Mierendorff (2016) go further by edogenizing informa-
tion process into optimization problem in Brownian motion framework and Poisson
bandits framework to study dynamics of learning intensity and direction respectively.
Some recent papers edogenize the random process family as well and give decision
maker full flexibility in designing information. Zhong (2017) studies flexible dynamic
information acquisition with a posterior separable information measure and shows
that confirmatory Poisson signal is optimal. Steiner et al. (2017) studies a repeated ra-
tional inattention problem with mutual information as cost. My paper contributes by
relaxing the restriction on information cost to only minimal assumptions. I show that
when impatience is measure by fixed cost, dynamic problem is closely related to static
rational inattention problem, and Poisson signals will be robustly optimal.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces characterization
of indirect information measure based on expected cost minimization. Section 3 setups
a dynamic information acquisition problem and provides solution.
2. Indirect information measure
2.1. Information structure and measure of informativeness
In this subsection, I make a formal definition for “information” in decision mak-
ing problems and a measure of informativeness. I extract key factors in any abstract
“information” that matters in a decision making problem and characterized a well
defined equivalence class that characterizes all information structures. On the other
hand, I use an “indirect information measure” characterization to derive minimal as-
sumptions we should impose on an information measure.
Definition 1.
1. Bayesian plausible posteriors: Let ∆X P R|X| be belief space over X. Let ∆2X be
the space of distributions over ∆X. Πpµq “
 
pi P ∆2X
ˇˇ ş
νdpipνq “ µ
(
is the set of
Bayesian plausible posterior distributions. Let Γ “
 
ppi, µq P ∆2X ˆ∆X
ˇˇ
pi P Πpµq
(
2. Information structure: Let S be an arbitrary set (set of signals). Let p P ∆Sˆ X be a
conditional distribution over S on x P X. pS, pq is an information structure. pS, pq can
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be equivalently represented as S , a random variable whose realization is determined by
p.
We’d like to study the “set” of all information structures as a choice set for de-
cision maker. However, since S is an arbitrary set, the “set” of all possible S is not
even a well-defined object from the perspective of set theory. Instead, we are going to
use Πpµq to equivalently characterize the “set” of all information structures. @ pS, pq,
@s P S, we can calculate the posterior belief from observing s according to Bayes rule.
The distribution of all such posterior will form a Bayesian plausible distribution as
define in Definition 1. Since different signals inducing same posterior belief affect nei-
ther choice of action nor expected utility, we claim that Πpµq already summarizes all
possible information structures (up to inducing same posteriors). Γ is defined as the
set of all pairs ppi, µq where pi represents an information structure at µ.
Definition 2 (Information measure). An information measure is a mapping I : Γ Ñ R`.
Ippi, µq can be equivalently represented by I pS ;X |µq where µ is distribution of X and S
induces belief distribution pi.
Information measure I is defined as a mapping from prior-information structure
pairs in Γ to extended non-negative real numbers. The only restriction I put on I
is that different information structures that induce same distribution of posterior pi
at µ will have same measure. This restriction is actually without loss of generality
because a DM only cares about induced distribution of posterior of an information
structure. Suppose different information structures have different measure, the DM is
always able to choose an appropriate information structure with lowest information
measure.1 Definition 2 is same as information cost function defined in Caplin and Dean
(2015). The only difference is that I explicitly modeled prior dependence of I: µ is an
argument in I as opposed to in Caplin and Dean (2015) prior is chosen and fixed in
the beginning so there is no need to explicitly specify information cost function for
different priors.
From this point on, for simplicity I will represent the choice set of DM as informa-
tion structures S . However, I don’t differentiate two information structures that in-
duces same distribution of posterior beliefs. By using notation ¨
ˇˇ
S , I mean conditional
on posterior beliefs induced by realization of S . Next step is to impose some restrictive
assumptions on I. The restriction I impose is about comparing measure of information
structure when they satisfies some information order. So first let’s formally define the
information order.
Definition 3 (Information processing constraint). Given random variables X ,S , T and
their joint distribution p px, s, tq. Let p pt|sq, ppt|s, xq be conditional distribution defined by
Bayes rule: p pt|sq “
ş
ppt,s,xqdxş
ppt,s,xqdxdt
and p pt|s, xq “
ppt,s,xqş
ppt,s,xqds
and:
p pt|s, xq “ p pt|sq
1Discussing this issue formally will lead to the problem of choosing inf from all possible S , which is not a well defined set. I
avoid dealing with this problem by making this restriction explicitly.
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for s, x with positive probability, then we define that X ,S , T form a Markov chain:
X Ñ S Ñ T
Definition 3 represents a most natural constraint in information acquisition prob-
lem: the causality constraint (I will also call this information processing constraint).
When we make any choice T based on information S , the choice should be purely
a result of information. Therefore, conditional on knowing the information, choice
should not contain any more dependence with underlying state. This will be the key
constraint I’m going to impose in Section 3.
Proposition 1. The following statements are equivalent:
1. X Ñ S Ñ T .
2. X and T are independent conditional on S .
3. S is a sufficient statistics for T w.r.t. X .
4. S is Blackwell more informative than T about X .
Proposition 1 comes mostly from Blackwell et al. (1951) and links information pro-
cessing constraint to other well-known notions in probability theory and information
theory. In fact, it defines a partial order on informativeness of information structures.
It’s intuitive that these notions are equivalent. They essentially all characterizes the
fact that S carries more information about X than T . From this point on, I will use the
four equivalent notions in an inter-changeable way.
Assumption 1. I pS ;X |µq satisfies the following axioms:
1. (Monotonicity) @µ, if X Ñ S Ñ T , then:
IpT ;X |µq ď I pS ;X |µq
2. (Sub-additivity) @µ, @ information structure S1 and information structure S2|S1 whose
distribution is conditional on realization of S1:
I ppS1,S2q;X |µq ď IpS1;X |µq ` ErIpS2;X |S1, µqs
3. (C-linearity) @µ, @ information structure S „ pµi, piq. @λ ă 1, consider Sλ „
pµi, µ, λpi, 1´ λq, then:
I pSλ;X |µq “ λI pS ;S |µq
Assumption 1 imposes three properties on information measure I. Monotonicity
says that if an information structure S is Blackwell more informative than (statistically
sufficient for) information structure T , then S should have measure no lower than T .
Sub-additivity says when we break a combined information structure into two com-
ponents, one conditional on the other, then the measure of the combined information
structure should be no higher than the expected total measure of two components.
C-linearity is a strengthen of sub-additivity in a special case: when a combined infor-
mation structure can be decomposed into pure randomness and another information
structure, then its cost should be expected cost of its components.
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With Assumption 1, my model still nests some standard models concerning in-
formation acquisition. Monotonicity directly states that my information measure is
consistent with Blackwell order of information (Blackwell et al. (1951)). My model in-
cludes rational inattention models that uses mutual information as information mea-
sure ( Sims (2003), Matejka and McKay (2014) etc. ) Mutual information is a special
case where my sub-additivity assumption is replaced with additivity and a logarithm
structure is imposed on information measure. In Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014) and
Zhong (2017), a posterior separable information measure, which is more general than
mutual information is used to model cost of information. Posterior separability is a
special case of additivity (see discussion in Zhong (2017)), thus a special case of sub-
additivity. Generally speaking, Assumption 1 nests most information measures used
in recent “information design” literature, where information is modeled in a non-
parametric way. However, it still excludes many interesting settings. For example,
it’s hard to verify whether Assumption 1 is satisfied in a parametric model. It also
fails prior independence (see He´bert and Woodford (2016)), which is a very natural
assumption when we think of information as objective experimentations.
2.2. Information cost minimization
To illustrate how restrictive Assumption 1 truly is, I’m going to show that it losses
little generality in the sense that it characterizes a indirect information measure if one
is able to choose combination of information structures in a flexible way to minimize
expected total measure required to construct a desired information structure.
Proposition 2. Information measure I˚ pS ;X |q satisfies Assumption 1 iff there exists in-
formation measure I pS ;X |µq s.t. @µ,S :
I˚ pS ;X |µq “ inf
pS i,Nq
E
«
Nÿ
i“1
I
´
S i;X |S1, . . . ,S i´1
¯ff
s.t. X Ñ
´
S1, . . . ,SN
¯
Ñ S
Proposition 2 states that when all possible information structures are available to
an expected information measure minimizer, for any information structure, she will
choose a way to re-construct it such that expected total information measure is mini-
mized. Then the effective measure for a piece of information will satisfy Assumption 1.
The intuition for Proposition 2 is quite simple. Consider expected information mea-
sure as a cost for information. If a Blackwell less informative information structure has
higher measure, then it will never been chosen because by choosing the more infor-
mative structure, a DM can still accomplish any goal feasible with the less informative
structure and pays a lower cost. This implies both monotonicity and sub-additivity.
C-linearity is a special case of sub-additivity when adding irrelevant noise to informa-
tion. On one hand, combining noise with information structure S , one can create Sλ.
On the other hand, combining Sλ and S1´λ one can create S . So additivity from both
direction implies C-linearity.
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There are many scenarios under which effective information measure is deter-
mined by minimization of expected measure. If we consider information as a product
provided in a competitive market, then the minimization problem in Proposition 2 is
very natural. The price of information will be marginal cost of information. And cost
minimization on sellers’ side implies price of information satisfying Assumption 1. (
In amonopolistic market there will be positive markups and varying information rents
so pricing might be very different, see Zhong (2016). ) Modern computer programs are
designed to balance work loads from independent processes onto nodes/threads. As a
result what matters is its average bandwidth, (as opposed to peak bandwidth or other
measures). If we consider information as data processed by a computer, then in each
CPU tick time, an optimally designed algorithm will minimize expected bandwidth
required to process information.
3. Dynamic decision problem
3.1. Model
Assume that a decision maker(DM) faces the following decision problem:
• Decision problem: Time horizon t “ 0, 1, . . . ,8 is discrete. Length of each time inter-
val is dt. Utility associated with action-state pair pa, xq is upa, xq. DM pays a linear
cost m of waiting. If the DM take action a P A at time t conditional on state be-
ing x P X, then her utility gain is upa, xq ´ mt. I assume utility gain to be totally
bounded: supa,x u pa, xq ă 8.
• Uncertainty: Not knowing the true state, DM forms a belief µ P ∆X about the state.
Her preference under uncertainty is expressed as von Neumann-Morgenstern ex-
pected utility. I am going to use two essentially equivalent formulations to express
expected utility. 1) Given belief µ, the expected utility associated with each action
a P A is Eµrupa, xqs. 2) State and action are represented by random variables X ,A.
Expected utility is denoted by ErupA,X qs.
• Information Cost: Given information measure in Definition 2, we define a time sepa-
rable information cost structure. In each period, with prior belief µ, DM pays infor-
mation cost f pI pS ,X |µqq which transforms informativeness of information struc-
ture acquired in the period into utility loss. f : R` ÞÑ R` is a non-decreasing
convex function which maps to extended real values.
• Dynamic Optimization: The dynamic optimization problem of the DM is:
Vpµq “ sup
S t,At,T
E
«
u
´
AT ,X
¯
´mT ´
8ÿ
t“0
f
`
I
`
S t;X
ˇˇ
S t´1, 1T ďt
˘˘ff
(P)
s.t.
#
X Ñ S t´1 Ñ 1T ďt
X Ñ S t´1 Ñ At conditional on T “ t
where T P ∆N, t P N. S´1 is defined as an uninformative variable that induces
belief same as prior belief µ of the DM (just for notation simplicity). S t´1 is defined
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as summary of past information
`
S1, . . . ,S t´1
˘
. The DM chooses action time T ,
choices of action conditional on action timeAt and signals S t subject to information
cost, waiting cost and two natural constraints for information processing:
1. Information received in last period is sufficient for stopping in current period.
2. Information received in last period is sufficient for action in current period. 2
In Equation (P), the DM is modeled as choosing information flow S t, decision time T
and choice of action At simultaneously, to maximize utility gain from action profile
net waiting cost and total information cost. Within each period, informativeness is
measured by I and incurs cost f pIq. Across period, information costs are aggregated
by expected sum of f . Since information measure is defined on information structure-
prior pairs. It’s important to define clearly how prior is determined. In each period,
information measure is evaluated conditional on realization of past signals and choice
of stopping. This is a natural setup since past information plus whether action is taken
in current period is exactly what the DM “knows” in current period. Therefore this is
the finest filter on which she evaluates information cost.
I will illustrate the cost structures of dynamic information acquisition with a simple
two period model: t P t0, 1u and DM has prior belief µ. Timing is as following: when
t “ 0, DM first chooses whether to take an action and which action to take. Second
she decides what information to acquire. when t “ 1, DM takes action based on infor-
mation acquired in period 0. First let’s consider deterministic continuation decision.
In period 0 no information has been acquired yet so if DM want to make a choice, her
expected utility will be calculated with prior µ: Eµ rupa,X qs and there is no waiting or
information cost. If DM wants to collect information before decision making, she can
acquire information structure S , now it’s for sure T “ 1 and X Ñ S Ñ A. There-
fore she gets expected utility E rupA,X qs, pays waiting cost m and information cost
f pIpS ;X |µqq.
The problem becomes less trivial when continuation is random: suppose DM chooses
to continue with probability p (independent to states because she has no information
yet about state). Only conditional on continuation, she acquires S . Within my frame-
work, total cost is p ¨ f pIpS ;X , µqq` p1´ pq ¨ 0 by calculating conditional cost on 1T ď0.
One might think that just conditional on information but not continuation decision,
the same information structure is essentially Sp and cost is f
`
I
`
Sp;X |µ
˘˘
. However,
this is saying that when DM is choosing information after decision making in period
0, she acquires a signal correlated to her previous choice of continuation. This piece
of randomness (whether to continue) is already resolved. Since our DM can not revert
time, this case is physically impossible.
2Noticing that in every period, the information in current period has not been acquired yet. So decision can only be taken
based on the information already acquired in the past. So the Markov chain property on information and action time/action will
have information lagged by one period. This within-period timing can be defined in different ways and it doesn’t affect main
results.
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3.2. Solution
In this section, I will solve the dynamic information acquisition problem defined
by Equation (P). First I characterize the optimal expected utility as solution to a simple
static information acquisition problem. Second, I provide a simple stationary strategy
that implements any static information and action strategy in Equation (P).
Theorem 1. If I satiesfies Assumption 1, @µ P ∆X, suppose expected utility level Vpµq solves
Equation (P), then:
Vpµq “ max
#
sup
aPA
Erupa,X qs, sup
IpA;X |µqěλ
E ru pA,X qs ´
ˆ
m
λ
`
f pλq
λ
˙
I pA;X |µq
+
(1)
The first superemum is taken over a, the second superemum is take over λ and A.
Theorem 1 establishes that solving the optimal utility level in Equation (P) is es-
sentially a static problem with Assumption 1. In the static problem, DM pays a fixed
marginal cost
´
m
λ `
f pλq
λ
¯
on each unit of information measure IpA;X |µq. Noticing
that optimal parameter λ only depends onm, f when constraint IpA;X |µq ě λ doesn’t
bind. There is a more explicit algorithm to solve Equation (1):
Proposition 3. If I satisfies Assumption 1, Vpµq solves Equation (P) if and only if it solves
the following problem: Let λ˚ “ sup
 
λ P R`
ˇˇ
m` f pλq ą λ ¨ B f pλq
(
and solve for
V0pµq “ sup
aPA
E rupa,X qs
V1pµq “ sup
A
ErupA,X qs ´
ˆ
m
λ˚
`
f pλ˚q
λ˚
˙
IpA;X |µq (2)
V2pµq “ sup
A
E rupA,X qs ´m´ f pIpA;X |µqq (3)
Let A be solution to Equation (2)3, then
Vpµq “
$’&’%
max
!
V0pµq,V1pµq
)
if sup
APA
IpA;X |µq ě λ˚
max
!
V0pµq,V2pµq
)
otherwise
Proposition 3 states that value function in Equation (P) can be solved by solving
three static problems. The first problem is a no-information benchmark where value
equals expected utiltiy from choosing optimal action according to prior. The second
problem is a standard rational inattention problem with marginal cost mλ˚ `
f pλ˚q
λ˚ on
information measure I. The interpretation is that under Assumption 1, dynamic in-
formaiton acquisition problem is separable in two parts. First part is dynamic alloca-
tion of information, keeping total information fixed. Marginal cost of increasing total
3If λ˚ “ `8, define A “ H. Here A includes all A exactly solving Equation (2) and sequences
 
Ai
(
approaching Equa-
tion (2). Given a sequence
 
Ai
(
P A, IpA;X |µq is defined as lim sup IpAi ,X |µq
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infomration is reflected by mλ˚ `
f pλ˚q
λ˚ , which measures impatience and smoothing in-
centive jointly. Second part is a static problem optimizing total information. The third
problem is a special case when there is under-smoothing. This happens when wait-
ing is so costly that it is optimal for decision maker to scale up information cost and
wait for less than one period. Since fractional period length is not feasible, in this case
decision maker solves a one-period problem.
Proposition 4. If I satisfies Assumption 1, @µ P ∆X, A P ∆AˆX and λ˚ ă IpA;X |µq, let`
S t,At, T
˘
be defined by4:
1. S´1 “ c0.
2. S t “
$’’&’’%
s0 if S
t´1 P A
Ť
ts0u
A with probability λ
˚
IpA;X |µq if S
t´1 “ c0
c0 with probability 1´
λ˚
IpA;X |µq if S
t´1 “ c0
3.
#
T “ t
At “ S t´1
if S t´1 P A.
Then:
E ru pA,X qs ´
ˆ
m
λ˚
`
f pλ˚q
λ˚
˙
I pA;X |µq “ E
«
u
´
AT ,X
¯
´mT ´
8ÿ
t“0
f
`
I
`
S t;X
ˇˇ
S t´1, 1T ďt
˘˘ff
Proposition 4 complements Theorem 1 by showing that the optimal value from
Equation (1) can be implemented using simple stationary experimentation strategy
feasible in Equation (P). Information structure S t explicitly codes three kinds of sig-
nals: Stop s0, Wait c0 and Action in A. First condition defines initial information. Sec-
ond condition defines information in following periods by induction: If S t´1 “ s0 or
A it means action is already taken and information acquisition stops from now on so
S t “ s0 and so on so forth. If S
t´1 “ c0 it means do nothing and delay all decision to
current period. Conditional on continuation, S t realizes asAwith λ
˚
IpA;X |µq probability.
And in next period action will be taken according to realization of S t. With 1´ λ
˚
IpA;X |µq
probability c0 realizes and decision is delayed to next period. Third condition explic-
itly defines T : when action is taken in period t as indicated by S t´1, then T “ t. It’s
easy to verify information processing constraints in Equation (P). First, conditional on
S t´1, the distribution of 1T ďt is degenerate. When S
t´1 “ c0 it’s 0 and 1 otherwise.
So S Ñ S t´1 Ñ 1T ď t. Second, conditional on S
t´1 and knowing T “ t, At is also
degenerate. It is exactly realization of S t´1. Therefore X Ñ S t´1 Ñ At.
Sketched proof.
Here I provide a simplified proof which illustrates the main intuition for Theorem 1
and Proposition 4. Since there is no discounting on utility gain, given an action pro-
cess AT , deterministic factor for expected utility is 1) the combined distribution of all
4s0 and c0 are chosen to be distinguishable from any element in action set A.
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actions A. 2) the expected waiting time ErT s. How actions are allocated over time
doesn’t affect expectation of utility at all. Since actions are driven by information, this
observation indicates that solving Equation (P) can be divide into three steps: Step 1
is to solve for optimal distribution of information over time to minimize information
cost given any combined information structure and waiting time. Step 2 is to solve
for optimal waiting time given any fixed combined information structure. Step 3 is to
solve for optimal combined information structure and associated action profile.
Step 1. Given any strategy
`
S t,At, T
˘
, let’s show that we can implement action
distribution AT and expected waiting time ErT s with a better design of informa-
tion. First, consider combining all information S “
`
S1, . . . ,S t, . . .
˘
. By sub-additivity
I pS ;X |µq ď
ř
E
“
I
`
S t;X
ˇˇ
S t´1
˘‰
. Then we consider averaging IpS ;X |µq into ErT s
periods:
IpS ;X |µq
ErT s
ď
ř
E
“
I
`
S t;X
ˇˇ
S t´1
˘‰
ErT s
ùñ f
ˆ
IpS ;X |µq
ErT s
˙
ď
ř
E
“
f
`
I
`
S t;X
ˇˇ
S t´1
˘˘‰
ErT s
ùñ ErT s f
ˆ
IpA;X |µq
ErT s
˙
ď
ÿ
E
“
f
`
I
`
S t;X |S t´1
˘˘‰
Second inequality is first by monotonicity of f then by convexity of f . That’s to
say: there is incentive to combined small information (by sub-additivity of I) and
smooth information over time (by convexity of f ). Last inequality is from IpS ;X |µq ď
I pA;X |µq by Blackwell monotonicity of I. Then an ideal strategy is to spend f
´
IpA;X |µq
ErT s
¯
on information acquisition every period.
Then let’s implement the aforementioned information cost using a strategy defined
as in Proposition 4. By C-linearity, acquiring A with probability 1ErT s exactly has cost
f
´
IpA;X |µq
ErT s
¯
. On the other hand, taking action with probability 1ErT s in each period
exactly implements combined action distribution A and expected waiting time ErT s.
Then it’s WLOG to consider:
sup
A,T
Eru pA,X qs ´mT ´ T f
ˆ
IpA;X |µq
T
˙
Step 2. Maximizing over ErT s (or T in the simplified problem). This can be done
easily by solving first order condition w.r.t. T: ´m ´ f
`
I
T
˘
` IT f
1
`
I
T
˘
“ 0. Replace
λ “ IT , we get the expression for λ: m` f pλq “ λ f
1pλq and further simplified problem:
sup
A
ErupA,X qs ´
ˆ
m
λ
`
f pλq
λ
˙
IpA;X |µq
The theorem deals with general case without smoothness assumption so f 1 is replaced
with sub-differentials B f .
Step 3. I will refer to Wierestrass theorem to show existence of solution. See Propo-
sition 5 for detailed discussion.
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In the sketched proof I implictly assumed f to be differentiable, first order condi-
tion has solution and optimal T ě 1. The formal proof for general case is provided in
Appendix B.1
3.3. Existence and uniqueness
In this section, I first show a general existence result for solution to Equations (2)
and (3). Then I established its uniqueness in different dimensions. By toggling in-
equality in defining monotonicity of I, concavity of g and sub-additivity of I to strict
inequality, my model will predict unique belief profile, unique information cost allo-
cation and unique strategy correspondingly.
Proposition 5. If A,X are finite sets, I satisfies Assumption 1, then
• Existence: @ε ą 0,∇ε “ tA|Pra|xs ě εu, then there exists a non-empty, convex and
compact set of solution Aε to Equation (1) subject to A P ∇ε.
– If Aε Ć B∇ε, then
Ť
ε1ěε Aε1 is solution to Equation (1).
– If Aε Ă B∇ε @ε ą 0, then any sequence in
ś
∇ε approaches Vpµq.
• Uniqueness:
– If I satisfies strict-monotonicity, then posterior belief νpaq associated with any ac-
tion a is unique for all optimal A.
– If f p¨q satisfies strict-convexity, then @ optimal strategy
`
S t,At, T
˘
to Equation (P),
I
`
S t;X |S t´1, 1T ďt
˘
is constant.
– If I satisfies strict-sub-additivity, then solution
`
S t,At, T
˘
to Equation (P) is
unique.
Proposition 5 establishes existence of solution to Equation (1) and uniqueness of
different aspects under certain conditions. First, with Assumption 1, very mild extra
assumptions (finite A and X) can guarantee existence of solution to Equation (1) (and
solution to Equation (P) as well). Second, when strictly more informative information
structure has strictly larger information measure, the belief inducing each action can
be uniquely pinned down by optimization. Third, when information cost function f
is strictly convex, then cost incurred in each experimentation period is constant over
time. Finally, if combination of informative experiments has strictly larger measure
than expected summation of components’ measures, then whole dynamic strategy is
uniquely pinned down.
The existence result is non-trivial in the sense that I don’t impose any continuity
assumption on I. However, I being an indirect information measure function actually
guarantees it to be convex in an appropriate space. By Equation (1), strategy space is all
random variable A. If we consider the space of all conditional distribution over A on
X, then this is an Euclidean space and I will exactly be a convex function on this space:
if S is a linear combination of S1 and S2, then S can be implemented as randomly
using S1 or S2 (and not knowing the choice of experiment). Therefore, monotonicity
12
and sub-additivity guarantees S to have lower measure than linear combination of
measures of S1, S2. Convexity of I implies both objective function to be continuous
and choice set to be compact.
The incentive for inter-temporal smoothing of information is clearly illustrated in
proof of Proposition 4 and Theorem 1: Convexity of information cost f implies incen-
tive to smooth cost over time. Sub-additivity of I implies incentive to smooth choice
of information structure over time. The incentive for choice of aggregate information
structure is illustrated in proof of existence: monotonicity and sub-additivity implies
a concave objective function. Now if any of aforementioned incentives is strict, then
solution will be uniquely pinned down in corresponding dimension. First consider
the proof for convexity of I in last part. Randomly using S1 or S2 (and know choice of
experiment) will carry strictly more information than S (which discards information
about which experiment is used). Therefore, strict monotonicity will imply objective
function being strict concave (except when S1 and S2 have same row vectors). Sec-
ond, consider step 1 in proof of Theorem 1. Suppose f is strictly convex, whenever
information cost is not a constant over time, is will be strictly dominated by stationary
strategy. Third, when there is strict sub-additivity, then any non-stationary experimen-
tation strategy will be dominated by the stationary one I consructed. What’s more,
objective function in Equation (1) will be strictly concave w.r.t any A. In this case, the
whole solution is uniquely pinned down.
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A. Proof in Section 2
A.1. Proof for Proposition 2
Proof. (Necessity) First suppose I˚pS ;X |µq satisfies Assumption 1. Then choose I˚ itself as I.
@µ and S . @X Ñ
`
S1, . . . ,SN
˘
Ñ S :
E
«
Nÿ
i“1
I˚
´
S i;X |S1, . . . ,S i´1
¯ff
ěI˚
´´
S1, . . . SN
¯
;X |µ
¯
ěI˚ pS ;X |µq
ùñ inf
pS i,Nq
E
«
Nÿ
i“1
I˚
´
S i;X |S1, . . . ,S i´1
¯ff
ěI˚ pS ;X |µq
First inequality is from sub-additivity. Second inequality is from monotonicity. On the other
hand, let S1 “ S , N “ 1, then
E
«
Nÿ
i“1
I˚
´
S i;X |S1, . . . ,S i´1
¯ff
“ I˚pS ;X |µq
ùñ inf
pS i,Nq
E
«
Nÿ
i“1
I˚
´
S i;X |S1, . . . ,S i´1
¯ff
ď I˚pS ;X |µq
Combining the two direction of inequality:
inf
pS i,Nq
E
«
Nÿ
i“1
I˚
´
S i;X |S1, . . . ,S i´1
¯ff
“ I˚pS ;X |µq
(Sufficiency) On the other hand, suppose given IpS ;X |µq,
I˚ pS ;X |µq “ inf
pS i,Nq
E
«
Nÿ
i“1
I
´
S i;X |S1, . . . ,S i´1
¯ff
s.t. X Ñ
´
S1, . . . ,SN
¯
Ñ S
Then
0. Uninformative signal: First it’s not hard to observe that acquiring no informaiton is suffi-
cient for an uninformative signal S . Therefore if choose N “ 0 we have, 0 ě I˚ pS ;X |µq.
Then:
I˚pS ;X |µq “ 0
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1. Monotonicity: @
`
S i
˘
s.t. X Ñ
`
S1, . . . ,SN
˘
Ñ S . Since X Ñ S Ñ T , we have X Ñ`
S1, . . . ,SN
˘
Ñ T . Therefore:
inf
pT i,Nq
E
«
Nÿ
i“1
I
´
T i;X |T 1, . . . , T i´1
¯ff
s.t. X Ñ
´
T 1, . . . , T N
¯
Ñ T
ďE
«
Nÿ
i“1
I
´
S i;X |S1, . . . ,S i´1
¯ff
ùñ inf
pT i,Nq
E
«
Nÿ
i“1
I
´
T i; T |T 1, . . . , T i´1
¯ff
s.t. X Ñ
´
T 1, . . . , T N
¯
Ñ T
ď inf
pS i,Nq
E
«
Nÿ
i“1
I
´
S i;X |S1, . . . ,S i´1
¯ff
s.t. X Ñ
´
S1, . . . ,SN
¯
Ñ S
ùñ I˚pT ;X |µq ď I˚pS ;X |µq
First inequality comes from that factor that
`
S i
˘
serves as one feasible group of
`
T i
˘
in the minimization. Second inequality comes from taking inf on RHS. Final inequality
comes from definition of I˚.
2. Sub-additivity: Suppose S “ pS1,S2q. @
´
S11 , . . . ,S
N1
1
¯
s.t. X Ñ
´
S11 , . . . ,S
N1
1
¯
Ñ S1.
@
´
S12 , . . . ,S
N2
2
¯
conditinal on S1 s.t. @ realization of S1, X Ñ
´
S12 , . . . ,S
N2
2
¯
Ñ S2.
Therefore:
X Ñ
´
S11 , . . . ,S
N1
1 ,S
1
2 , . . . ,S
N2
2
¯
Ñ pS1,S2q Ñ S
ùñ I˚ pS ;X |µq ď E
«
N1ÿ
i“1
IpS i1;S |S
1
1 , . . . ,S
i´1
1 q
ff
` E
«
N2ÿ
i“1
IpS i2;X |S1,S
1
2 , . . . ,S
i´1
2 q
ff
ùñ I˚pS ;X |µq ď inf E
«
N1ÿ
i“1
IpS i1;S |S
1
1 , . . . ,S
i´1
1 q
ff
` inf E
«
N2ÿ
i“1
IpS i2;X |S1,S
1
2 , . . . ,S
i´1
2 q
ff
ùñ I˚pS ;X |µq ď I˚ pS1;X |µq ` E rI
˚pS2;X |S1, µqs
3. C-linearity: @S , consider S1 “ pt0, 1u ,λ, 1´ λq being an uninformative binary signal.
S2 “ S when S1 “ 0 and constant when S1 “ 1. Therefore
`
S1,S2
˘
“ Sλ. By sub-
additivity:
I˚pSλ;X |µq ď λI
˚pS ;X |µq
On the other hand, consider S1 conditional on Sλ. If Sλ induces ν ‰ µ, then S
1 is
uninformative. Otherwise S1 “ S . Then
`
Sλ,S
1
˘
“ S , by sub-additivity:
I˚pS ;X |µq ď I˚pSλ;X |µq ` p1´ λq I
˚pS ;X |µq
ùñ λI˚pS ;X |µq ď I˚pSλ;X |µq
To sum up, λI˚pS ;X |µq “ I˚pSλ;X |µq.
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B. Proof in Section 3
B.1. Proof for Theorem 1
Proof. Let Vpµq be expected utility in Equation (P). Then by assumption Vpµq ě 0. Suppose
Vpµq “ 0, then Theorem 1 is straight forward. Vpµq is achieved by choosing doing nothing
and acquiring no information. From now on, we assume Vpµq ą 0. Pick any ε ă Vpµq, we
want to show that there exists A, T s.t.:
Vpµq ´ ε ď E ru pA,X qs ´mT ´ T f
ˆ
IpA;X |q
T
˙
Suppose
`
S t,At, T
˘
solves Equation (P) approches Vpµq up to ε2 :
Vpµq ´
ε
2
ďE
«
u
´
AT ,X
¯
´mT ´
8ÿ
t“0
f
`
I
`
S t;X
ˇˇ
S t´1, 1T ďt
˘˘ff
where
#
X Ñ S t´1 Ñ 1T ďt
X Ñ S t´1 Ñ At conditional on T “ t
Lemma 1 ( Lemma 7 in Zhong (2017)) shows that we can assume the signal structure WLOG
takes the following form:
S t “
#
s0 when T ď t
At`1 when T “ t` 1
Therefore,At`1,1T ďt and 1T “t`1 are all explicitly signal realizations included in S
t. We discuss
two cases separately:
Case 1. ErT s ě 1: Consider ST “
`
S0,S1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,ST
˘
as a combined information structure of all
signals in first T periods. By sub-additivity in Assumption 1:
E
«
8ÿ
t“0
I
`
S t;X
ˇˇ
S t´1, 1T ďt
˘ff
“E
«
8ÿ
t“0
I
`
S t;X
ˇˇ
S t´1
˘ff
“I
`
S0;X
ˇˇ
µ
˘
` E
«
8ÿ
t“1
I
`
S t;X
ˇˇ
S t´1
˘ff
“I
`
S0;X
ˇˇ
µ
˘
` E
”
I
´
S1;X
ˇˇ
S0
¯ı
` E
«
8ÿ
t“2
I
`
S t;X
ˇˇ
S t´1
˘ff
ěI
`
S1;X
ˇˇ
µ
˘
` E
«
8ÿ
t“2
I
`
S t;X
ˇˇ
S t´1
˘ff
ě . . .
ěI
`
ST;X |µ
˘
` E
«
8ÿ
t“T`1
I
`
S t;X
ˇˇ
S t´1
˘ff
ùñ
8ÿ
t“0
E
“
f
`
I
`
S t;X
ˇˇ
S t´1
˘˘‰
ě I
`
ST;X
ˇˇ
µ
˘
@T (B.1)
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Now consider:
8ÿ
t“0
E
“
I
`
S t;X
ˇˇ
S t´1
˘‰
“
8ÿ
t“0
`
ProbpT ď tqE
“
I
`
S t;X
ˇˇ
S t´1
˘ ˇˇ
T ď t
‰
` Prob pT ą tq E
“
I
`
S t;X
ˇˇ
S t´1
˘ ˇˇ
T ą t
‰˘
“
8ÿ
t“0
`
ProbpT ď tqE
“
I
`
s0;X
ˇˇ
S t´1
˘ ˇˇ
T ď t
‰
` Prob pT ą tq E
“
I
`
S t;X
ˇˇ
S t´1
˘ ˇˇ
T ą t
‰˘
“
8ÿ
t“0
Prob pT ą tq E
“
I
`
S t;X
ˇˇ
S t´1
˘ ˇˇ
T ą t
‰
(B.2)
Since Vpµq ´ ε ą 0, then:
m ¨ ErT s ď max v
ùñ Prob pT ą Tq ¨ T ¨m ď max v
ùñ Prob pT ą Tq ď
max v
mT
ùñ Prob pT ď TqE
”
u
´
AT ,X
¯ ˇˇ
T ď t
ı
ě E
”
u
´
AT ,X
¯ı
´ Prob pT ą Tq ¨max v
ùñ Prob pT ď TqE
”
u
´
AT ,X
¯ ˇˇ
T ď t
ı
ě E
”
u
´
AT ,X
¯ı
´
max v2
mT
Choose T` 1 ą mε
max v2
. Now combine Equations (B.1) and (B.2), and
ř8
t“0 ProbpT ą tq “ E rT s,
then we have:
I
`
ST;X
ˇˇ
µ
˘
ď
8ÿ
t“0
Prob pT ą tq E
“
I
`
S t;X
ˇˇ
S t´1
˘ ˇˇ
T ą t
‰
ùñ
IpST;X |µq
E rT s
ď
8ÿ
t“0
ProbpT ą tqř
ProbpT ą τq
E
“
I
`
S t;X
ˇˇ
S t´1
˘ ˇˇ
T ą t
‰
ùñ f
ˆ
IpST;X |µq
E rT s
˙
ď
8ÿ
t“0
ProbpT ě tqř
ProbpT ą τq
f
`
E
“
I
`
S t;X
ˇˇ
S t´1
˘ ˇˇ
T ą t
‰˘
ùñ ErT s f
ˆ
IpST;X |µq
E rT s
˙
ď
8ÿ
t“0
ProbpT ą tqE
“
f pIpS t ;X |S t´1, 1T ątqq
‰
ùñ ErT s f
ˆ
IpST;X |µq
E rT s
˙
ď E
«
8ÿ
t“0
f pIpS t ;X |S t´1, 1T ďtqq
ff
Consider AT`1 “
`
A0,A2, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,AT`1
˘
as a random variable which summarizes realizations
of all At. Since At`1 are directly included in S t, we have X Ñ ST Ñ AT`1. Therefore, by
Assumption 1:
I
´
AT`1;X |µ
¯
ď I
`
ST;X |µ
˘
ùñ ErT s f
ˆ
IpAT`1;X |µq
ErT s
˙
ď E
«
8ÿ
t“0
f pIpS t ;X |S t´1qq
ff
That’s to say, if we can implement AT`1 with expected waiting time ErT s and information
cost ErT s f
´
IpAT`1 ;X |µq
ErT s
¯
, then utility level will be weakly higher than V. We define the new
strategy as follows:
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1. In each period, acquire a combined information structure by mixing AT`1 with proba-
bility 1ErT s and uninformative signal structure with probability 1´
1
ErT s .
2. Following arrival of signal AT`1, choosing the corresponding action.
3. If no informative signal arrive, do nothing and go to next period.
It’s not hard to see that in this strategy, action and signal are identical thus the three information
processing constraint are naturally satisfied. In each period, the probabiltiy of decisionmaking
is 1ErT s and the distribution of actions is A
T`1. Therefore, totally utility gain is:
8ÿ
t“0
ˆ
1´
1
ErT s
˙t 1
ErT s
ErupAT`1,X qs “ E
“
upAT`1,X q
‰
Expected waiting time is:
8ÿ
t“0
ˆ
1´
1
ErT s
˙t 1
ErT s
¨ t “ ErT s
Expected experimentation cost is:
8ÿ
t“0
ˆ
1´
1
ErT s
˙t
f
ˆ
IpAT`1;X |µq
ErT s
˙
“ ErT s f
ˆ
IpAT`1;X |µq
ErT s
˙
Therefore, we find a strategy which is no worse than original strategy than ε2 . Then:
Vpµq ďErupAT`1,X qs ´mErT s ´ ErT s f
ˆ
IpAT`1;X |µq
ErT s
˙
` ε
ď sup
A,T
E ru pA,X qs ´mT ´ T f
ˆ
IpA;X |q
T
˙
` ε @ε
ùñ Vpµq ď sup
A,T
E ru pA,X qs ´mT ´ T f
ˆ
IpA;X |q
T
˙
Therefore, we proved Theorem 1 when ErT s ě 1.
Case 2. ErT s ă 1: Since T P N, ErT s ă 1 means PpT “ 0q ą 0. When T “ 0, no informatin is
acquired yet and decision making is based on prior. Therefore:
E
«
upAT ,X q ´mT ´
Tÿ
t“0
f
`
IpS t;X |S t´1q
˘ff
“ProbpT “ 0qE
“
upA0,X q|T “ 0
‰
` ProbpT ě 1qE
«
upAT ,X q ´mT ´
Tÿ
t“1
f
`
IpS t;X |S t´1q
˘ ˇˇˇˇˇT ě 1
ff
ďProbpT “ 0qmax
a
Eµrupa,X qs ` ProbpT ě 1qE
«
upAT ,X q ´mT ´
Tÿ
t“1
f
`
IpS t;X |S t´1q
˘ ˇˇˇˇˇT ě 1
ff
First equality is from law of iterated expectation. Inequality is from when T “ 0, choice of A0
is not necessarily optimal. Suppose:
max
a
Eµrupa,X qs ě E
«
upAT ,X q ´mT ´
Tÿ
t“1
f
´
IpS t;X |S t´1q
¯ ˇˇˇˇˇT ě 1
ff
ùñ E
«
upAT ,X q ´mT ´
Tÿ
t“0
f
´
IpS t;X |S t´1q
¯ff
ď max
a
Eµrupa,X qs
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Then strategy pS t,At, T q is dominated by acquiring no information and this already proves
Theorem 1. Suppose on the other hand:
max
a
Eµrupa,X qs ă E
«
upAT ,X q ´mT ´
Tÿ
t“1
f
´
IpS t;X |S t´1q
¯ ˇˇˇˇˇT ě 1
ff
ùñ E
«
upAT ,X q ´mT ´
Tÿ
t“0
f
´
IpS t;X |S t´1q
¯ff
ăE
«
upAT ,X q ´mT ´
Tÿ
t“1
f
´
IpS t;X |S t´1q
¯ ˇˇˇˇˇT ě 1
ff
Then we define strategy S t1,A
t
1, T1 where: pS
t
1,A
t
1, T1q “ pS
t,At, T
ˇˇ
T ě 1q. Then it’s straight
foward that:
E
«
upAT11 ,X q ´mT1´
T1ÿ
t“0
f
´
IpS t1;X |S
t´1
1 q
¯ff
“E
«
upAT ,X q ´mT ´
Tÿ
t“1
f
´
IpS t;X |S t´1q
¯ ˇˇˇˇˇT ě 1
ff
We only need to verify the information processing constraints.
• When T1 ď t: S
t
1 “ s0
• When T1 “ t` 1: S
t
1 “ S
t “ At`1 “ At`11 .
• T1 “ 0 happen with zero probability.
However, in this case ErT ě 1s. Therefore this goes back to case one. To sum up, we showed
that:
Vpµq ď max
#
sup
A
ErupA,X qs, sup
A,Tě1
E ru pA,X qs ´mT ´ T f
ˆ
IpA;X |q
T
˙+
On the other hand the inequality of the other hand is straight foward, any strategy achieve the
RHS can be achieved in origianl problem Equation (P). Therefore:
Vpµq “ max
#
sup
A
ErupA,X qs, sup
A,Tě1
E ru pA,X qs ´mT´ T f
ˆ
IpA;X |q
T
˙+
(B.3)
Finally, we consider solving optimal T in Equation (1). Fix I, consider:
inf
Tě1
ˆ
mT ` T f
ˆ
I
T
˙˙
I first show that the objective function is quasi-convex. mT is already linear, so it’s sufficient
to show quasi-convexity of T
`
I
T
˘
. By transforming argument, it’s not hard to see that it’s
equivalent to show quasi-convexity of
f pIq
I w.r.t. I. Now consider I1 ă I2 and λ P p0, 1q.
Suppose by contradiction:
f pI1q
I1
“
f pI2q
I2
ă
f pλI1p1´ λqI2q
λI1 ` p1´ λqI2
ùñ
λ f pI1q ` p1´ λq f pI2q
λI1 ` p1´ λqI2
ă
f pλI1p1´ λqI2q
λI1 ` p1´ λqI2
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contradicting convexity of f pIq. Therefore, mT` T
`
I
T
˘
is quasi-convex in T. Since f is convex,
it always has one-side derivatives well defined. So an necessary condition for T solving the
problem will be:
m` f
ˆ
I
T
˙
´
I
T
f 1`
ˆ
I
T
˙
ď 0 ď m` f
ˆ
I
T
˙
´
I
T
f 1´
ˆ
I
T
˙
λ“ IT
ðùñ m` f pλq ´ λ f 1`pλq ď 0 ď m` f pλq ´ λ f
1
´pλq
ðñ
m` f pλq
λ
P B f pλq
What’s more, since f is convex, the correspondence f pλq ´ λ f 1pλq is increasing (in set order).
Therefore, the set of λ such that
m` f pλq
λ P B f pλq must be an connected interval. Therefore,
m` f pλq
λ P B f pλq is actually also sufficient for minimizing mT` T f p
I
T q.
Case 1.: tλ|m` f pλq P λB f pλqu ‰ H: Since f is convex, B f is a continuous correspondence,
therefore the set is closed. Pick the smallest λ:
mT ` T f
ˆ
I
T
˙
“m
I
λ
`
I
λ
f pλq
“
ˆ
m
λ
`
f pλq
λ
˙
I
Therefore, the total cost paid can be summarized by:ˆ
m
λ
`
f pλq
λ
˙
IpA;X |µq
Finally, the constraint T ě 1 can be replaced by:
I pA;X |µq
λ
ě 1
ðñ IpA;X |µq ě λ
Theorem 1 is proved.
Case 2.: m` f pλq ´ λB f pλq ą 0 @λ. That is to say:
mT ` T f
ˆ
I
T
˙
is strictly increasing in T @I. Therefore, independent of choice I, choosing smaller T will yield
higher utility. T will eventually be smaller than 1. So we can rule out this case.
Case 3.: m` f pλq ´ λB f pλq ă 0 @λ. That is to say:
mT ` T f
ˆ
I
T
˙
is strictly decreasing in T @I. However this is not possible since:
lim
TÑ8
mT ` T f
ˆ
I
T
˙
“ `8
To sum up, if tλ|m` f pλq P λB f pλqu “ H, then we define λ “ 8. Then the constraint for
second term in Equation (B.3) can never be satisfied and Vpµq “ supa E rupa,X qs.
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Lemma 1 (Reduction of redundency).
`
S t, T ,AT
˘
solves Equation (P) if and only if there exists´ rST , T ,AT ¯ solving :
sup
S t,T ,AT
8ÿ
t“0
ˆ
e´ρdtPrT “ ts
`
E
“
upAt,X q|T “ t
‰˘
(B.4)
´ PrT ą tsE
”
f
´
I
´ rS t;X ˇˇ rS t´1¯¯ ˇˇT ą tı˙
s.t. rS t “
$’&’%
s0 when T ă t` 1
At`1 when T “ t` 1
S t when T ą t` 1
What’s more, the optimal utility level is same in Equation (P) and Equation (B.4).
Proof. Suppose
`
S t, T ,At
˘
is a feasible strategy to Equation (P). Let first show that it’s WLOG
that the DM can discard all information after taking an action: take given T and At, take s0 as
a given degenerate signal, define pS t as:
pS t “ #S t when T ě t` 1
s0 when T ď t
By definition, pS t “ S t conditional on T ě t` 1. Therefore:
I
´ pS t;X | pS t´1, 1T ďt¯ “
#
I
`
S t;X |S t´1, 1T ďt
˘
when T ď t
0 when T ě t` 1
X Ñ pS t Ñ At`1 conditional on T “ t
To show that the first information processing constraint is satisfied, we discuss the case pS “ s0
and pS ‰ s0 separately:
• When pS t´1 “ s0, T ď t´ 1. Therefore:
Prob
´
T ą t
ˇˇ pS t´1 “ s0,X¯ “ 0
Prob
´
T ď t
ˇˇ pS t´1 “ s0,X¯ “ 1
which is independent of realization of X .
• When pS t´1 ‰ s0, T ě t. Then by law of total probability:
Prob
´
T ą t
ˇˇ
S t´1
¯
“Prob
´
T ą t
ˇˇ
S t´1,X
¯
“Prob
´
T ą t
ˇˇ
S t´1,X , T ě t
¯
ProbpT ě t|S t´1,X q
` Prob
´
T ą t
ˇˇ
S t´1,X , T ă t
¯
ProbpT ă t|S t´1,X q
“Prob
´
T ą t
ˇˇ
S t´1,X , T ě t
¯
ProbpT ě t|S t´1,X q
ùñ Prob
´
T ą t
ˇˇ pS t´1,X¯
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“
Prob
´
T ą t| pS t´1¯
Prob
´
T ě t| pS t´1,X¯
“Prob
´
T ą t| pS t´1¯
which is independent of realization of X .
Therefore, we proved that:
X Ñ pS t´1 Ñ 1T ďt
Therefore
´ pS t,At, T ¯ is feasible and :
E
«
8ÿ
t“0
e´ρdt¨t f
´
I
´ pS t;X ˇˇ pS t´1, 1T ďt¯¯
ff
“E
«
T ´1ÿ
t“0
e´ρdt¨t f
´
I
´ pS t;X ˇˇ pS t´1, 1T ďt¯¯
ff
“E
«
T ´1ÿ
t“0
e´ρdt¨t f
`
I
`
S t;X |S t´1, 1T ďt
˘˘ff
ďE
«
8ÿ
t“0
e´ρdt¨t f
`
I
`
S t;X |S t´1, 1T ďt
˘˘ff
Therefore,
´ pS t,At, T ¯ is a feasible strategy dominating `S t,At, T ˘. Now we define rS t:
rS t “
$’’&’’%
s0 when T ă t` 1
At`1 when T “ t` 1pS t when T ą t` 1
Initial information rS´1 is defined as a degenerate(uninformative) signal and induced belief is
the prior. Verify the properties of rS t:
1. When rS t´1 P ts0u Y A, it’s for sure that T ď t. Otherwise, T ą t. Therefore 1T ďt is a direct
garbling of rS t´1. So we must have X Ñ rS t´1 Ñ 1T ďt.
2. When T “ t, At “ rS t´1. Therefore X Ñ rS t´1 Ñ At conditional on T “ t.
3. Information measure associated with
´ rS t,At, T ¯when T ą t:
I
´ rS t;X ˇˇ rS t´1, T ą t¯
“1T “t`1 I
´
At`1;X
ˇˇ rS t´1, T “ t` 1¯
` 1T ąt`1I
´ rS t;X ˇˇ rS t´1, T ą t` 1¯
“1T “t`1 I
´
At`1;X
ˇˇ pS t´1, T “ t` 1¯
` 1T ąt`1I
´ pS t;X ˇˇ pS t´1, T ą t` 1¯
ď1T “t`1 I
´ pS t;X ˇˇ pS t´1, T “ t` 1¯
` 1T ąt`1I
´ pS t;X ˇˇ pS t´1, T ą t` 1¯
“I
´ pS t;X ˇˇ pS t´1, T ą 1¯
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First inequality is simply rewriting two possible cases of T . Second equality is from definition
of rS t when T ą t ` 1. First inequality is from X Ñ pS t Ñ At`1 conditional on T “ t `
1. Therefore,
´ rS t, T ,At¯ dominates the original solution in Equation (P) by achieving same
action profile but lower costs.
´ rS t, T ,At¯ is a feasible solution to Equation (B.4). Therefore
solving Equation (B.4) yields a weakly higher utility than Equation (P). What remains to be
proved is that any
´ rS t, T ,At¯ feasible in Equation (B.4) can be dominated by some strategy
feasible in Equation (P). It’s not hard to see that it’s feasible in Equation (P). Finally we show
that the two formulation gives same utility:
E
«
e´ρdt¨T ErupAT ,X qs ´
8ÿ
t“0
e´ρdt¨t f
´
I
´ rS t;X ˇˇ rS t´1, 1T ďt¯¯
ff
“
8ÿ
t“0
´
e´ρdtPrT “ ts
`
E
“
upAt,X q|T “ t
‰˘
´ E
”
f
´
I
´ rS t;X ˇˇ rS t´1, 1T ďt¯¯ı¯
“
8ÿ
t“0
ˆ
e´ρdtPrT “ ts
`
E
“
upAt,X q|T “ t
‰˘
´ PrT ą tsE
”
f
´
I
´ rS t;X ˇˇ rS t´1¯¯ ˇˇˇT ą tı˙
Therefore, Equation (P) is equivalent to Equation (B.4).
B.2. Proof for Proposition 3
Proof. The outer maximization of Equation (1) is trivial. We focus on solving:
Vpµq “ sup
IpA,X |µqěλ
E rupA,X qs ´
ˆ
m
λ
`
f pλq
λ
˙
I pA;X |µq (B.5)
Case 1. λ˚ ă 8. By definition of λ˚, we know that
λ˚ “ inf argmin
λ
ˆ
m
λ
`
f pλq
λ
˙
Let
gpIq “
ˆ
m` f pmin tI,λ˚uq
min tI,λ˚u
˙
I
Then
m` f pλ˚q
λ˚ I ď gpIq ď m` f pIq and gpIq is a convex function on r0,8q.Equation (B.5) can be
rewritten as:
Vpµq “ sup
A
E rupA,X qs ´ g pI pA;X |µqq (B.6)
Therefore by definition:
V2pµq ď Vpµq ď V1pµq
Now it is sufficient to show that if supAPA IpA;X |µq ě λ
˚ then Vpµq ě V1pµq, otherwise
Vpµq ď V2pµq. First of all, suppose supAPA IpA;X |µq ě λ
˚, then by definition of supAPA IpA;X |µq
there exists
!
Aij
)
s.t:
ErupAij,X qs ´
ˆ
m
λ˚
`
f pλ˚q
λ˚
˙
I
´
Aij,X |µ
¯
ě V1pµq ´
1
i
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IpAij;X |µq ě λ
˚ ´
1
j
´
1
i
ùñ
$&%ErupAii,X qs ´
m` f pλ˚q
λ˚
I
´
Aii;X |µ
¯
Ñ V1pµq
IpAii;X |µq Ñ λ
˚
ùñ V2pµq ě ErupAii,X qs ´m´ f
´
I
´
Aii;X
ˇˇˇ
µ
¯¯
“ErupAii,X qs ´
m` f pλ˚q
λ˚
I
´
Aii;X
ˇˇ
µ
¯
`
¨˝
m` f
´
I
´
Aii;X
ˇˇˇ
µ
¯¯
I
´
Aii;X
ˇˇˇ
µ
¯ ´ m` f pλ˚q
λ˚
‚˛I ´Aii;X ˇˇˇµ¯
ÑV1pµq
ùñ V2pµq “ Vpµq
Now suppose supAPA I pA;X |µq ă λ
˚. Assume by contradiction that Vpµq ą V2pµq. Then I
first claim that @Ai solving Equation (B.6), lim sup IpAi;X |µq ď λ˚. If this claim is true, then
there is immediately a contradiction:$&%lim IpA
i;X |µq “ λ˚
lim ErupAi,X qs ´ g
´
I
´
Ai;X |µ
¯¯
“ Vpµq
ùñ lim ErupAi,X qs ´ gpλ˚q “ Vpµq
ùñ lim ErupAi,X qs ´ f
´
IpAi;X |µq
¯
“ Vpµq ą V2pµq
Suppose the claim is not true, then Vpµq ă V1pµq and there exists:$&%
lim IpAi1;X |µq “ λ
1 ą λ˚
lim ErupAi1,X qs ´
m` f pλ˚q
λ˚
I
´
Ai1;X |µ
¯
“ Vpµq$&%
lim IpAi2;X |µq “ λ
2 ă λ˚
lim ErupAi2,X qs ´
m` f pλ˚q
λ˚
I
´
Ai2;X |µ
¯
“ V1pµq
@α P r0, 1s consider compound experiment: S0 is an unrelated random draw with outcome 1
with probability 1´ α and 2 with α. Conditional on 1, do experiment Ai1 and follow recom-
mendation. Otherwise doAi2 and follow recommendation. Call this information structureA
i
α.
Then Assumption 1 implies:
IpAiα;X |µq ď p1´ αqIpA
i
1;X |µq ` αIpA
i
2;X |µq
Since l1 ą λ˚ ą λ2, WLOG we can assume IpAij;X |µq is bounded within λ
1,λ2 by ε and 2ε ă
λ1 ´ λ˚. Now consider the utlity of strategy Aiα in Equation (B.6). Suppose IpA
i
α;X |µq ă λ
˚
for all α ą 0, then:
lim
αÑ0
E
”
upAiα;X q
ı
´ g
´
IpAiα;X |µq
¯
ěE
”
u
´
Ai1
¯
;X
ı
´ g pλ˚q
ěVpµq `
`
gpλ1 ´ εq ´ gpλ˚q
˘
´
1
i
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Since g is a strictly increasing function with λ ą λ˚, given any δ ă gpλ1 ´ εq ´ gpλ˚q, there
exists αi s.t.
E
”
upAiαi ;X q
ı
´ g
´
IpAiαi ;X |µq
¯
ě Vpµq ´
1
i
` δ
Suppose there exists αi s.t. IpAi
αi
;X |µq “ λ˚, then:
E
”
upAiαi ;X q
ı
´ g
´
IpAiαi ;X |µq
¯
“E
”
upAiαi ;X q
ı
´
m` f pλ˚q
λ˚
IpAiαi ;X |µq
ěVpµq ` αpV1pµq ´Vpµqq ´
1
i
`
m` f pλ˚q
λ˚
´
p1´ αqIpAi1;X |µq ` αIpA
i
2;X |µq ´ IpA
i
αi
;X |µq
¯
ěmax
$’&’%
Vpµq ` αpV1pµq ´Vpµqq ´
1
i
Vpµq ´
1
i
`
m` f pλ˚q
λ˚
`
p1´ αqpλ1 ´ εq ` αpλ2 ´ εq ´ λ˚
˘
“Vpµq ´
1
i
`max
"
αpV1pµq ´Vpµqq,
m` f pλ˚q
λ˚
`
λ1 ´ αpλ1 ´ λ2q ´ ε´ λ˚
˘*
The maximum is independent to i and strictly positive for any α. Therefore:
lim
iÑ8
E
”
upAiαi ;X q
ı
´ g
´
IpAiαi ;X |µq
¯
ą Vpµq
Contradicting optimality of Vpµq. To sum up, I show that when supAPA IpA;X |µq ă λ
˚,
Vpµq “ V2pµq. Therefore:
Vpµq “
$’&’%
V1pµq if sup
APA
IpA;X |µq ě λ˚
V2pµq if sup
APA
IpA;X |µq ă λ˚
Case 2. λ˚ “ `8. By definition of λ˚,
´
m
λ `
f pλq
λ
¯
is strictly decreasing in λ. @A,λ be-
ing feasible in Equation (B.5), it can be improved by replacing λ with IpA;X |µq (feasibility
is still satisfied). Therefore, it is without loss of optimality to assume constraint binding and
Equation (B.5) becomes:
sup
A
ErupA,X qs ´m´ f pIpA;X |µqq
which is exactly Equation (3).
B.3. Proof for Proposition 5
Proof. Existence: Equations (2) and (3) can be solved prior by prior. Therefore, I sometimes
don’t explicitly include prior any more in this proof. It’s not hard see that it’s sufficient to
prove existence of solution to:
sup
A
E rupA,X q ´ f pIpA;X |µqqs (B.7)
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where A P ∆A ˆ X and f is convex. Equation (B.7) can be modified to accommodate Equa-
tion (2) by set f to be a linear function. This can be WLOG directly modeled in changing infor-
mation measure I. Equation (B.7) is different from Equation (3) by only a constant. Therefore,
it is sufficient to show existence of solution to Equation (B.7) under Assumption 1.
Next let’s explicitly model the set of all feasible A’s: ∆Aˆ X P Rp|A|´1qˆ|X|. Let’s call this
set Λ and any conditional distribution p pa|xq P Λ. We define rI : Λ Ñ R`:
rI ppp¨|¨qq “ I pγq
where γ “ ppi, µq P Γ and pi is defined by distribution of posteriors induced by p:$&%µspxq “
pps|xqµpµqř
y pps|yqµpµq
pipµsq “
ř
y pps|yqµpyq
Our original problem Equation (B.7) can be written as:
sup
pPΛ
ÿ
a,x
ppa|xqµpxqupa, xq ´ f
´rIppq¯
To show existence of solution, it will be sufficient to show convexity of rI. If rI is convex, the
objective function is continuous in p and the space Λ is compact (a closed and bounded set in
Eclidean space). Now let’s study convexity of rI. Consider @ p1, p2 P Λ. Let p “ λp1`p1´λqp2.
It’s not hard to verify that p P Λ as well. Want to show:
rIppq ď λrIpp1q ` p1´ λqrIpp2q
Now define p1 on A ˆ t1, 2u “ ta1, a2, . . .u with twice number of signals than A. Let λ1 “
λ,λ2 “ 1´ λ, @a, x
p1pai|xq “ λipipa|xq
Then p1 will be Blackwell more informative than p:»————–
1 1 0 0 ¨ ¨ ¨ 0 0
0 0 1 1 ¨ ¨ ¨ 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 0 ¨ ¨ ¨ 1 1
fiffiffiffiffifl ¨ p1 “ p (B.8)
On the other hand, p1 can be written as combination of p1 and p2. Let S0 be randomly t1, 2u
with probability λ1,λ2. Let pS1|1, µq „ p1 and pS1|2, µq „ p2. Then it’s easy to see that
pS0,S1, µq „ p
1. Therefore:
rIppq ďrIpp1q
“IpS0,S1;X |µq
ďIpS0;X |µq ` λ1 I pS1|1;X |µq ` λ2 I pS1|2;X |µq
“λrIpp1q ` p1´ λqrIpp2q
First inequality is from monotonicity, second inequality is from sub-additivity. Therefore rI is
a convex (and continuous) function. It’s easy to see that Λ is a compact set. So we can apply
Wierestrass theorem to conclude existence of solution.
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Now suppose p1,p2 are two distinct maximizer. Consider p “ αp1`p1´αqp2. By convexity
of rI and f :
Eµ rupa, xqppa, xqs “αEµ rupa, xqp1pa, xqs ` p1´ αqEµ rupa, xqp2pa, xqs
f
´rIppq¯ ďα f ´rIpp1q¯` p1´ αq f ´rIpp2q¯
Therefore p weakly dominates p1 and p2 and p P A. A is convex.
Uniqueness: Now suppose I also satisfies strict-monotonicity. Then consider proof in last
section. First, let p1 ‰ p2. Suppose equality rIppq “ rIpp1q holds, then strict-monotonicity implies
that p is Blackwell sufficient for p1:
M ¨ p “ p1
Where M is a stochastic matrix. Consider the following operation: If p11 „ p
1
2, then proof is
done. Otherwise, first remove replication of p1 (when two rows of p1 are mutiplications of each
other, then add them up) and get rp1. Since p11  p12, we can assume rp11 “ p11, rp12 “ p12. Definep1 “ p11 ` p12 and pi “ rp1i`1. By definition rp1 Blackwell dominates p. On the other hand, p
Blackwell dominates p, so dominates p1, and rp1. By Lemma 2, rp1 and p are identical up to
permutation. Then p11 must equal to some pi.
• Case 1. If i “ 1, then p11 ` p
1
2 is a multiplication of rp111 , which is a multiplication of rp11.
This means p11 and p
1
2 are replication, contradiction.
• Case 2. If i ą 1, then rp11 is a multiplication of pi, which is a multiplication of rp1i`1. Con-
tradicting definition of rp1.
Therefore, p11 and p
1
2 are replications. Now permute p
1 and apply the same analysis on all
p12i´1, p
1
2i. We can conclude that any row of p1 is a replication of that of p2. To sum up, a
necessary condition for rIppq “ αrIpp1q` p1´ αqrIpp2q is that each row in p1 and p2 induces same
posterior belief ν.
Now consider A being set of solutions to Equation (1). Suppose by contradiction there
exists A1 and A1 and a such that they induces different posterior with realization a. Let p1, p2
be corresponding stochastic matrices, consider any A „ αp1 ` p1´ αqp2. By previous proof,
IpA;X |µq ă αrIpp1q ` p1´ αqrIpp2q. In first part, we show that A is convex, so A is feasible.
This contradicts unimprovability.
To sum up, solutions to Equation (B.7) always have the same support. Of course if A is
uninformative, then it induces prior µ. In both case, support of posteriors is uniquely deter-
mined.
Lemma 2 (Blackwell equivalence). Let P and P1 be two stochastic matrices. P has no replication of
rows. Suppose there exists stachatic matrices MPP1 and MP1P s.t.:
P1 “ MP1P ¨ P
P “ MPP1 ¨ P
1
Then MPP1 and MP1P are permutation matrices.
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Proof. Let Pi “ ppi1, pi2, . . .q be ith row of P. Suppose Pi can not be represented as positive
combination of P´i’s. Then by construction Pi “ MPP1i ¨MP1P ¨ P, we have:
MPP1i ¨MP1P “ p0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , 0looomooon
i´1
, 1, 0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , 0q
Then by non-negativity of stochastic matrices, suppose MPP1ij ą 0, then MP1Pj are all 0 except
MP1Pji. Then for all such rows j, we have MPP1 j be a vector with only ith column being non-
zero. However this suggests they are replicated rows. So the only possibility is that j s.t.
MPP1ij ą 0 is unique. And
MPP1ij ˆMP1Pji “ 1
Since stochastic matrices have elements no larger than 1, it must be MPP1ij “ MP1Pji “ 1. This
is equivalently saying P1j “ Pi. Since permutation of rows of P
1 doesn’t affect our statement,
let’s assume P1i “ Pi afterwards for simplicity.
So far we showed that if Pi is not a positive combinations of P´i’s, then P
1
i “ Pi. We do the
folloing transformation: rP, rP1 are P, P1 removing ith row. ĂMPP1 ,ĂMP1P are MPP1 ,MP1P removing
ith row and column. It’s easy to verify that we still have:
rP1 “ ĂMP1P ¨ rPrP “ ĂMPP1 ¨ rP1
and ĂMPP1 ,ĂMP1P still being stochasticmatrices since previous argument showsMPP1ii andMP1Pii
being the only non-zero element in their rows. Since they are both 1, they must also be
only non-zero element in their columns. So removing them doesn’t affect the matrices being
stochatic matrices.
Now we can repeat this process iteratively until any row rPi will be a positive combination
of rP´i. If rP has one unique row, then the proof is done. We essentially showed that P “ P1 (up
to permutation of rows). Therefore we only need to exclude the possibility of rP having more
than one rows.
Suppose rP has n rows. Then rP1 is a posistive combination of rP´i’s:
rP1 “ nÿ
i“2
a1i
rPi
and rP2 is a positive combination of rP´i’s:
rP2 “ nÿ
i‰2
a2i
rPi
“a21
rP1 ` nÿ
ią2
a2i
rPi
“a21a
1
2
rP2` nÿ
ią2
´
a2i ` a
2
1a
1
i
¯ rPi
Since all rows in rP are non-negative (and strictly positive in some elements). This is possible
only in two cases:
• Case 1. a21a
1
2 “ 1 and
ř
ią2
`
a2i ` a
2
1a
1
i
˘
“ 0. This implies rP1 “ a12 rP2. Contradicting non-
replication.
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• Case 2. a21a
1
2 ă 1. Then
rP2 is a positive combination of rPią2. Of course rP1 is also a positive
combination of rPią2.
Now by induction suppose rP1, . . . , rPi are positive combinations of rPjąi. Then:
rPi`1 “ iÿ
j“1
ai`1j
rPj ` nÿ
j“i`1
ai`2j
rPj
“
nÿ
k“i
¨˝
iÿ
j“1
ai`1j a
j
k
‚˛rPk ` nÿ
j“i`2
rPj
“
iÿ
j“1
ai`1j a
j
i`1
rPi`1` nÿ
k“i`2
¨˝
iÿ
j“1
ai`1j a
j
k ` a
i`1
j
‚˛rPj
Similar to previous analysis, non-replication implies
ři
j“1 a
i`1
j ă 1 and
rPi`1 is a positive com-
bination of rPjąi`1. Then by replacing rPi`1 in combination of all rPjďi, we can conclude thatrP1, . . . , rPi`1 are all positive combinations of rPjąi`1. Finally, by induction we have all rPiăn be-
ing positive combination of rPn. However, this contradicts non-replication. To sum up, we
proved by contradiction that rP has one unique row. Therefore, P must be indentical to P1 up
to permutations.
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